New Global Wars – A Challenge for Nonviolence

Draft version 2006-09-04

Dr STELLAN VINTHAGEN
Göteborg University, Sweden
Email: stellan.vinthagen@padrigu.gu.se

This is a rough and preliminary draft version of a paper I am working on and which I need some critical input on in order to develop it. It deals with nonviolent strategies for countering “new wars”.
I especially need comments on how to characterize “new wars”, the arguments about legitimacy, the selection strategy for a case study, the strategies for nonviolent intervention in new wars.
Thanks,

Stellan
0704-763 789

XX = Reminder of that information is missing
Text within [ ] = Needs to be developed

Planned Structure of the Paper:

1. Intro: Problem and definitions.
2. New Global Wars: A challenge for Nonviolence
3. Nonviolent resistance and legitimacy: the classic understanding
   The legitimacy need of various regimes
4. The nonviolent constructive program: Building new legitimacy
5. Understanding the empirical cases of new wars
6. [A case study of war and nonviolence in Colombia]
7. [Conclusion Learning from the Case] + Possible Nonviolent actions against new wars?
8. References

1: Intro: Problem and definitions.

This paper deals with peaceful strategies against “new wars”, or more specific; with the challenges to nonviolent action studies, as just one part of peace research, posed by new wars. For peace research in general, and nonviolent action studies in particular, the main research topic is how peace by peaceful means is possible. Thus, war and dictatorship are the main challenges to peace research, and new warfare
techniques or dynamics means new challenges for the conventional peace strategies proposed by peace research.

The last decade a fundamental change in warfare has been proposed and the concept of “new wars” has been discussed, or “network wars”, “wars of the third kind”, “global civil war” etc., here subsumed as “new wars” (Duffield 2001; Kaldor 2006; Münkler 2002), also in the Swedish peace research, as “new internal wars” (Lindholm-Schulz. Basically it is argued that a fundamentally new kind of war has developed in the last decades, one which is typically (more) intra-state, privatized, asymmetrical and globalised, than the “conventional” war. This article will discuss but take the proposal as a given in order to be able to examine what challenges this pose for nonviolent action studies. That means that I will not engage in the discussion on if new wars exists, when wars became new and what (exactly) the difference is between conventional and new wars (see e.g. Berdal 2003; Chojnacki 2004; Hendersen 2002; Newman 2004). The main propositions are temporary taken at face value. I will also not try to evaluate the reasons behind this new trend (see e.g. Elbadawi & Sambanis 2002; Jackson 2002; Simons 1999).

War is here understood as organised and collective violence undertaken by at least one of the parties in a conflict. War is not necessarily involving a state or aiming for state-power. This wider definition is used in order not to out-define important cases or important variations of war-making. A common definition is that at least one state is involved in a conflict where at least 1 000 persons are killed each year. In this case, it is important to include also cases where no state at all is involved. In the literature there is often a difference made between “war” and “terrorism”. Terrorism is here distinguished from (conventional) war by that terrorism, firstly, do not necessarily aim to overtake existing power institutions (the state) or to create new ones, only to destroy, change or weaken existing power organisations (which are de facto or only in the view of the terrorist: “occupying” organisations) (cf. Garrison 2004). Secondly, the terrorists are not even pretending (as war-makers) to follow international laws and convention regulating collective violence. They do not strive for a popular legitimacy among an existing population but strive for a pure dominance or legitimacy among certain (ethnic) groups within or outside the country. New Wars are per definition a phenomenon that blurs the distinction between war and terror, it is a conventional war that tends to become terrorism, you could say. Duffield (2001)
argue that also war-lords look for legitimacy, social transformation and regulation – but in their own and new ways, through fear and violence.

There is an assumed logic behind (conventional) war; that violence serves the purpose to gain or defend power, and since the 17th century the power to gain or defend has been the state. Any war actor who strive for state power need to (at least somehow during the war and fully after a military victory) consolidate that power base within the population of that state, i.e. gain some active support and legitimacy in the country. An occupying military rule through plain force and fear (i.e. “domination”), but is thus not able to gain such strong “hegemonic” power as the legitimate ruler. Hegemony is peculiar since it is a state were people serve power holders since they believe it is right to do so since power is perceived as benevolent or just, or it is at least in their self-interest.

The concept of “new wars” fundamentally questions this political logic of war, and thus, the logic of conventional (and political) peace strategies. There seems still to be a fundamental lack of new peaceful strategies to counter “new wars” (Falk 2004; Jackson 2002; Marcon & Pianta 2000; Möller, undated; Sisk 2001; Tommasoli 2003). Most writers suggests UN military interventions of “peace enforcement” (i.e. conventional war) or the same methods as before; war-tribunals, peace keeping, multi-track diplomacy, humanitarian intervention, peace observations, mediation from “third” parties or negotiations between the parties themselves and powerful regional/global actors (i.e. the US or Nato) when the war-makers are “exhausted” and a “ripe moment” has occurred. The point is, as we shall see, that the new kinds of war do not so easily become exhausted, since the war-makers thrive on war-making, since they are “war-entrepreneurs”. Some more novel ones exist, like the idea of promoting “islands of civility” as e.g. the non-partial peace villages in war-zones of Colombia that refuses to cooperate with any military actor.

There is simply a need to develop new possibilities and avenues for how to deal with new wars. New strategies are needed since the present ones seem to be at least partly another side of the problem.

“the strategic complexes of liberal peace, that is, the emerging relations between governments, NGOs, militaries and the business sector, are not just a mechanical response to conflict. In fact, they have good deal in common, in structural and organisational terms, with the new wars.[...]...each is learning how to project power
in new non-territorial ways. With contrasting results, liberal peace and the new wars have blurred and dissolved conventional distinctions between peoples, armies and governments. At the same time, new systems of reward and mobilisation, especially associated with privatisation, have emerged in the wake of the outmoding of such divisions. Liberal peace and the new wars are also both forms of adaptation to the effects of market deregulation and the qualification and attenuation of nation-state competence. In many respects, the networks and complexes that compose liberal peace also reflect an emerging liberal way of war.” (Duffield 2001: 13-14, my emphasis).

New strategies are needed, especially if we are looking for alternatives to the most popular recipe; the enforced UN-armies, although they are multilateral and probably a less violent-alternative and also seem to make a real difference for peace-making (Doyle & Sambanis 2000). Especially for peace research that assume the role of promoting a different and more peaceful road to conflict resolution. One of the discourses close to peace research, partly within it, is nonviolent action studies (Alphin 2002; Sharp 1973, 2004; Martin XX; Radhakrishnan 2003; Summy 2002; Weber XX).

2: New Global Wars – A Challenge for Nonviolence

What is new in the challenge for nonviolence by the new wars? It is not the level of violence to civilians, or the profit motives, or the international connections of the war-making, or the lack of shared liberal values or ethical principles among actors, ethnic cleansing. Instead, it is rather new when war is getting fundamentally privatized, politically complex, without a rule of law, accompanied by collapsing states, actors that do not seek legitimacy from the people, and connected with genocide.

Research on nonviolent action is suffering from two major flaws: the focus on state/national-regime change in an increasing global and market-dominated world (Castells 1996) and the focus on state organised wars, despite that this kind of war is disappearing, being replaced by “new wars” (Kaldor). These research areas are still
important, but less so in our contemporary world. The globalisation of the nation state changes the conditions of nonviolent action in all states of the world, in some more than others. The new wars are tormenting only some states but are on one level present in most states in the criminal network economy and in marginalised neighbourhoods – e.g. in Bronx, New York and [name of suburb XX], Paris. This one-sided kind of research focus on the state comes from problems dominating societies during high modernity (e.g. colonialism or civil rights) and suits older theories developed in accordance with these social/political problems.

Contemporary power relations and violence dynamics calls for the development of other research questions, theories and methodologies concerning the specific possibilities and constraints of transnational and local nonviolent action directed against various non-state actors.

Mary Kaldor has shown that “new wars” are not organised by the centralised state bureaucracy but rather is a result of “collapsing states”. The new wars are basically the opposite of the traditional kind of professional, public and hierarchal “politics by other means” of the state organised military. The new wars are driven by a privatisation of the military and the target of the identity driven violence is the civilian population. Instead of trying to get legitimacy from the people they get control through a kind of politics of fear and difference. The “war economy” makes former illegal activity as drugs, smuggling, prostitution, protection fees and theft the main sources of income, both for the sustained war, the creation of warlords and for the daily livelihood of poor soldiers. Current important differences between war, peace, legitimacy, legality, terrorism and criminality are systematically blurred. War/peace zones overlap and change constantly, well organised warlords become a kind of semi-authority even after the (intensive) war is ended, through their own power politics and by being included in so called peace negotiations.

This has disturbing consequences for the research and praxis of nonviolent action, since most of the nonviolence research being done have focused on civilian-based defence, social defence or nonviolent actions/movements/campaigns in national settings and in relation to a central power administration which needs and aspire legitimacy and legality. Since Gandhi nonviolence has been described as the “nonviolent war/soldier”, displayed with equivalent strategies to guerrilla armies (Ackerman & Kruegler 19XX; Sharp 1973; 2004). When this foundational condition
of nonviolent action is changed it means that we need to look for new openings. And when we do there is a need to find more than the creation of war-tribunals and fundamental social change which redeems the roots of war (see Radhakrishnan 2003; Summy 2002). What is a new kind of nonviolence that can match the new kind of war? But before we are able to creatively explore avenues for new nonviolent actions and strategies against contemporary wars, we need to understand the problems these kinds of wars are posing. The problems facing nonviolent action will sometimes be specific, and different from the ones present researchers are posing. E.g. what point will there be to break state laws in doing nonviolent civil disobedience when the state is not the one conducting the war anyhow? Is there other power relations which the new warlords are dependent on that nonviolent activist might use in order to create pressure?

Kaldor describes the creations of “islands of civility”, e.g. the peace villages in war-torn Colombia, keeping outside of the war, representing the civil society of respectful difference, dialogue and rights, situated within the ocean of warmongering. That gives hope but is not proactive enough and does not meet the criteria of nonviolence, as described by Gandhi, acting without and against violence (Vinthagen 2005). We also need to develop realistic strategies which confront and undermines the new wars, not just create refuge or exile, i.e. investigating what makes these islands of civility into counter-cultures breading not only plurality, civility and dialogue, but peaceful resistance.

The main proposition of the “new wars” paradigm is that a new type of war is created through globalisation, which simultaneously fragment the nation-state and makes identity-processes insecure. Besides that main thesis there are a high number of characteristics suggested for “new wars”.

**Suggested characteristics of new wars** (cf. Duffield 2001; Kaldor 2006; Lindholm-Schulz 2002; Münkler 2002; Möller, undated):

- Personal gain (economic or political power)
- Expansion in nearby areas
- Decreased stateness
- Growing asymmetry (no fronts or big battles, but attacks on civilians)
- Growing autonomy of forms of violence (which were exclusive earlier)
- Criminality and war are brought together
• War-entrepreneurs
• Para-state actors and private actors (mercenaries, militias, child soldiers)
• State-collapsing wars (not state-building wars like those in Europe earlier in history)
• Externally influenced (politically and economically)
• Diffusion of violence/force in time and space (no beginning or end, and no difference made between front-line, home regions and upland)
• Strategic defensive (low-intensive warfare)
• Peace processes (not peace-agreements that make a closure of the war)
• 80 % of those killed are civilians (in early 20\textsuperscript{th} century it was 90 % soldiers)
• De-disciplination of the soldiers
• Re-sexualisation of violence
• Violence is connected to hunger/food and sickness/health
• Commercialisation of war-making
• Driven by ethnic or religious belongings (constructed as non-imagined but “natural” or “essence”) in a kind of new fundamentalism and identity politics.
• The increased importance of mass-media in construction of enemy images and war-propaganda, on all sides.

If all of these were taken as criteria for defining “new wars” it would probably not stand the test. For our purpose it is not necessary to judge if all of them are valid or not. It is enough to take on the main challenge. To my judgement it seems like the greatest challenge comes from private actors with no need for legitimacy who thrive on war-making in an area where the state has collapsed and where these private actors are engaging in genocide. A society that enables or allows genocidal war-entrepreneurs and war-lords is what constitute the challenge for nonviolence studies and nonviolent strategy.

In classic nonviolent studies there is a proposition of three kinds of methods to use: protest, non-cooperation and intervention (Sharp 1973; 2004). But protest builds on assumed need for hegemony, non-cooperation on an assumed need for economic, political or social cooperation from the people, and, finally, intervention,
builds on the assumption that the power structures of war-makers are accessible. All of these methods are undermined by new wars, some even made irrelevant. “Protest” in war-zones is probably one of them.

One of the more powerful forms of nonviolent resistance is disobedience or non-cooperation with the rules of the regime, it is also is the most known form of nonviolent action, and, the one mostly connected to the old state-paradigm. Could then, the concept of new wars, be said to create a fundamental crisis of the non-cooperation thesis?

After that, we will discuss one of the more neglected nonviolent action opportunities; the constructive program. What Gandhi saw as the building of the new society by creating and nurturing new political, economic and cultural institutions – able to replace the institutions underpinning war-making.

### 3: Nonviolent resistance and legitimacy – the classic understanding

From a perspective of the history of ideas civil disobedience involves engaging politics by breaking a law, rule or norm, and doing so by taking a personal responsibility and not threatening others with the use of violence (Sharp 1973). Civil disobedience is a political methodology that moves on the border of legality and legitimacy (Habermas 1988. Cohen & Arato 1994). Normative order is central to social systems’ rule-guided action coordination. Social rules only function as binding rules if they are understood as legitimate and treated as valid by the very people the rules are suppose to rule. The social perception of the legitimacy of a normative order is the fundament that makes a otherwise arbitrary “rule” into something treated as enforcing, necessary or justified. The normative order can be facilitated by the threats of sanctions and promises of goods, but threat and promises will only give the system efficiency, not legitimacy. Legitimacy is based on some kind of incorporation of a justification by the very people that are supposed to follow that normative order.¹

---

¹ Legitimacy arises from some kind of combination of communicative action (Habermas), voluntary subordination to a hegemon (Gramsci), the world view developed from a social position (Ricoeur) or class based ideology (Marx), facilitated by incorporated behavioural or discursive conditioning of power relations (Lukes) in “truth-regimes” (Foucault) or “habitus” (Bourdieu). These different theoretical perspectives are not possible to simply add together when explaining legitimacy. Fortunately though, it is not necessary at this point to argue what really creates legitimacy – it is
In terms of legitimacy, civil disobedience builds on legitimate norms in a society while breaking existing incompatible political system laws. It is about breaking the law while respecting the legitimacy of the norms valid in society, exposing the differences between existing laws and norms. Norms are not formalized and democratically agreed upon, but they do exist as a basic social order and are fundamental also for the political economy.

In terms of efficiency, civil disobedience uses this regime-dependence on the normativity of civil society, the very people that are the base of the political and economical power production of regime elites. Disobedience is thus in theory a fundamental threat to the power structures which are enabling regime elites to rule. Every act of disobedience has the potential to spread through movement mobilisation, depending on the degree it succeeds at exposing the lack of legitimacy of regimes. But organising disobedience is difficult. Framing the action in such a way that it becomes a visualization of the norm-law-discrepancy is not easy, even if the movement might be correct about the reality. It is a problematique of frame-construction, image-making and control of communication flows. But more importantly, the regime’s ultimate economic and administrative dependency on the de facto behaviour of people. If the rules are treated as valid in behaviour, that might be enough for the power system to function. Creating awareness does not in itself translate into changed behaviour. A lot of habits and complex structures might facilitate the continuation of routine behaviour enabling the system to function. The law-abiding culture even among fierce intellectual and political critics of globalisation shows that clearer than anything else.²

If the disobedience is conducted with “civility”, i.e. respectful and without violent means, there is an assumption that resistance creates conditions for negotiations with regime elites. Thus, civil disobedience could be understood as a method within the war of position (Gramsci) which together with its counter-hegemonic bloc might facilitate structural change, constituting an alternative to military struggle.

Despite the revolutionary potential of massive civil disobedience, actions are normally not done with very many people or sustained very long, at least in liberal democracies. This might explain why restrained forms of civil disobedience are sufficient to argue how different theories claim that power-holders/regimes need some legitimacy among the members of society in order to keep power relations stable.

² The obedience of the critics is the main problem according to Henry David Thoreau (19XX). It sustains the belief of “openness” or “democracy”, thus justifying existing structures.
widely accepted by researchers on democracy theory (Rawls, Habermas, Cohen & Arato 1994), when it is not massive and works as a correction tool for system anomalies (as “problemsolving” in Coxian terms). Despite the breaking of laws there is inherently an acceptance of other rules of the system – not using violence, taking personal responsibility, going to court trials and participating in the public debate about the action. By confronting specific laws while supporting the fundamental normativity of the system as such, this method is able to distinguish between legality and legitimacy.

Through symbolic dramatization of the disobedient action, social definitions of problems and solutions can be changed (Goffman 1986, Melucci 1996) which might have consequences for power relations (Vinthagen 2005). This can make injustice visible (M.L. King), alternatives attractive or power relations obvious (Benford & Hunt 1995). If the dramatization is combined with a media strategy even single actions might have huge influence on the public discussion and the political agenda (McAdam 1996 on the civil rights movement in USA). These drama-images will be a communicative material in civil society.

A movement using civil disobedience may democratise a society, even when the power holders are unwilling to change, by creating an incentive or necessity to negotiate social order. The combination of movements’ civilized non-cooperative disobedience and economic/administrative/normative dependency of power holders, creates the kind of “peoples’ power” which e.g. democratised apartheid South Africa and authoritarian Serbia.

3:1 The legitimacy need of various regimes

The effectiveness of illegal actions disturbing the WTO was what made “The battle in Seattle” so famous in the global mass media and movement culture. The movement globalisation from below (the “antiglobalisation movement”) is using a wide spectra of methods, where only one of them is civil disobedience. Historically such has been the case with other disobedient movements (Sharp 1973:II). It is unusual that a movement uses disobedience as its only method. The reason might be simple, since it

---

3 If the system does not contain democratic rules at all civil disobedience might get a revolutionary dynamic.
is likely that only the combination with other methods makes civil disobedience effective (Sharp 1973:III). But the dynamic of disobedience depends on the social situation.

Civil disobedience might be used in various national society structures. Historically the method developed from movements questioning the legitimacy of national societies’ laws (abolition of slavery in USA) or an entire constitution (colonial India). Three different national social contexts might serve as examples of disobedience diverse social dynamic, while being a method that always raise the same question: Is this regime (policy) really legitimate?

In a liberal democracy where the state has legitimacy, disobedience is normally only able to become legitimised as a reformist correctional tool by minority mobilisations (e.g. the civil rights movement in USA), not massive revolutionary movements. In an authoritarian regime the power of the state is instead built on elite-alliances (e.g. economic, ethnic, and military). In such situations it might be possible to legitimate majority mobilisations of disobedience, e.g. Iran 1979 or The Philippines 1986 (ref??). In fragmented societies where the formal state lacks legitimacy, like e.g. in Rwanda or Cambodia during the 90ies, civil disobedience gets another role, one which is still not investigated. When the formal claim of the state on sovereignty, a territorial monopoly of violence, does not hold true in real politics, the state is not able to solve problems in the existing power order. So the laws of the state are then simply not the targets. But every society has some kind of order and social groupings (segments), be it tribes, clans, political actors or military elites. The leaders of these groupings need to have some internal legitimacy in their group in order to survive as leaders and set the rules of their social system. If ever civil disobedience is usable in such circumstances as fragmented societies, then I suggest it could play a role as a segment-internal questioning of the legitimacy of authority. We could then for example, expect members of a tribe resisting through disobedience against the leadership of that same tribe.

A traditional way of movements to challenge legitimacy has been with demonstrations (of their discontent), in the streets or by other signs of protest, e.g. open letters. But they are tools for key groups in society, those that the regime depends on – in a liberal democracy that will be the majority, in the 19th century society represented by the modern working class, the industry workers. In a high-tech post-modern society it might be other groups, e.g. pilots, electricians or computer-
technicians. But it might as well be special army-units, intellectuals, media stars, symbol-analytics (PR-experts, Spin-doctors, etc.) or other key professionals. Legal demonstrations have been organised and will be organised but there is a fundamental difference between demonstrations and civil disobedience. Demonstrations are not creating a confrontational drama but are a show of numbers, in order to “demonstrate” the importance of the matter for a proportion of civil society. It is a sort of physical dramatisation of opinion polls. Regimes can decide to listen to the critical voice surfaced in a demonstration, or decide to ignore it. To expose the unjust international world order and show that regimes lack legitimacy in a way that can’t be ignored is the role of system-critical methods, like civil disobedience and direct action. The activists are trying to literally disturb or block the normal working of regime institutions, forcing the elite to listen.

4: The Nonviolent Constructive Program: Building New Legitimacy

Gandhi developed a “Constructive Programme” which later became known under the heading “Sarvoday”, i.e. welfare for all, or as the heir of Gandhi, Vinoba, phrased it: welfare for the last. This development strategy is a matter of mobilising all resources for the general good of society. It is focusing on mobilisation of popular participation, distribution rather than growth and autonomy (Hettne & Tamm 1971). For Gandhi it is the second and parallel part of the resistance struggle, a realisation of the liberation in practical reality, a complete independence, from the bottom up (“Poorna Swaraj”). The specific constructive program which he proposed (Gandhi 1945) was “only illustrative” and an attempt to accommodate to the Indian context

"Those who think that the major reforms will come after the advent of Swaraj are deceiving themselves as to the elementary working of non-violent Swaraj. It will not drop from heaven all of a sudden one fine morning. But it has to be built up brick by brick by corporate self-effort” (1945:21).

The production of Indian clothes through home-production was a symbol of "the unity of Indian humanity, of its economic freedom and equality...[the]
decentralization of the production and distribution of the necessaries of life” (1945:10). The constructive program, if the whole nation applied it, would make resistance unnecessary (1945:25f). But otherwise the whole point is that resistance and construction is coupled ”before, after, as well as during satyagraha campaigns” (Chabot 2003:55). The parallel to civil disobedience is a kind of “civil usurpation”, to take over, where the activists act is if their demands where already fulfilled and without regard for the rulers take over the positions and roles they strive for (Ebert 1983:42). It means creating their own institutions which made laws, administrated and judged, with a parallel government. Through a committee that replaces those leaders that are killed or imprisoned these institutions are kept functional. The two main points of the constructive program was that it

"generated the moral strength and grassroots leadership required for nonviolent direct action and helped convert the drama created by nonviolent direct action into concrete community development” (Chabot 2003:201)

The ambition was to revolutionise the society in its foundation, or as JP expressed it in the 70s: "Total Revolution”. The anthropologist Richard Fox (1989:Chapter 3) describe it as a concrete social revolution with nine parts: the welfare of all ("sarvodaya"), simple lifestyle where the desires of the individual is subordinated the needs of society, self-control on all levels ("swaraj"), the service of your neighbour and the local (swadeshi), spiritual resistance ("satyagraha and ahimsa"), mutual contracts between workers and capitalists ("trusteeship"), self-reliance of basic needs ("bread labour"), local autonomy (the village republic, ”panchayat raj”) and ordered anarchy ("oceanic circles and ramrajya”).

Here is a combination of utopian revolution and practical reform in a carachteristic combination (Fox 1989:60). It is been labelled revolutionary, gradual, populism, anarchist, socialist or totalitarian (Fox 1989:59). Gandhi is anti-dichotomist and tries to transcend antithetical positions. I think it is possible to understand as the synthesis of resistance and construction, as ”creating community” or as Martin Luther King called it, the beloved community, a “genuine intergroup and interpersonal living, integration” (Chabot 2003:188).
In what sense could the constructive work involve the creation of new social structures and institutions that would support the creation of a peace “from below”? My suggestion is that it could basically:

- Create some of the legitimacy needed of peace-makers to mobilise support
- Create some self-confidence, training opportunity, skills and empowerment necessary to resist
- Create some of the resources to stand repression of war-makers

A threat for this strategy of constructive work is that warlords would either attack and destroy these institutions or take control of them. The question is once again, how to deal with the private militias of war-lords that would need the resources created in the constructive program to sustain their war-economy and who do not fear the loss of legitimacy if they kill constructive program workers? The main question is how that threat could be avoided or undermined? Are there any new nonviolent methods to be used in order to deal with the threat?

That is what we will look for in our empirical case. How have various groups done constructive work and resistance? What can we learn from their experience? What are the possibilities and problems?

5: Understanding the Empirical Cases of New Wars

First we need to discuss the choice of what case(s) to investigate. There exist a number of suggestions in the literature on where the wars occur, what are the characteristics of each case compared with others, and how people have dealt with these wars.


The old cases are characterized by insurgent guerrilla groups and counter-guerrilla tactics from regular armies, death squadrons and other para-military groups. Several of the characteristics of new wars are present in these cases, even though it is widely believed that the new wars occur from the 1990s. Accepting that major proposition within the discourse of new wars means that ongoing old wars might have changed character during the 1990s, or they are still and altogether part of the old and conventional warfare (although a special variation, i.e. “civil war”).

Some of the examples mentioned are cases of clearly collapsing states (e.g. Somalia) others more unclear so. In cases of collapsing states; does states collapse because of the war activities or does the war occur when (for other reasons) the state collapse? In some of these cases there is at least one (intact) state actor (e.g. Russia in Chechnya), in others no one is clearly detectable (but might be behind other actors) (e.g. in Afghanistan 1989-1996 where the “state” only existed in Kabul and limited areas of the country until the Taliban took power).

How to distinguish between different kinds of new wars? One way is to understand New Wars as not a fundamentally new category but rather as “more-or-less” in relation to different aspects of war-making. Thus, a specific war could be more or less a “new war”. We could create a number of scales of types where we have one extreme case in each end of the continuum. The overriding logic would then be a scale between:

**Conventional war---------------New War---------------Terrorism**

Here it is assumed that conventional war is driven by a *state and power logic* of conducting political power struggles with other means, i.e. a logic of gaining and sustaining legitimacy among people and the territory where they live – while terrorism is driven by the opposite logic, a *private and violence logic* of control by fear, domination, destruction, exploitation and externalisation of problems. “New wars” is then assumed to be a “in-between” case, a mix of the logic of conventional war and the logic of terrorism.
Categorising “new wars”:

Role of the state:
1: Intact states ---------Collapsing states during war--------- Collapsing states (Strong states)

State as actor:
2: Only state actors ------------One state actor-------------No state actor

Role of the law:
3: Only legal warfare-------Clear war-crimes happens---------Only war-crime acts

Who use arms?
4: Regular armies -----------Mainly private armies-----------Armed civilians

Degree of “globalness”:
5: Only territorial actors ---------Global links -------------Global war-drives (e.g. two states) (pol., econ., cultural)

Targets of violence:
6: Geneva abiding wars---------Ethnic cleansing-----------------Genocide

Role of economy:
7: Economy undermined--------Economic drives exist-------------War-economy

Beginning of the war:
8: Before the 1960s--------1970s-------1980s--------1990s--------After 1990s

Proportion of civilians among the killed ones (directly by the war):
9: Less than 50 %---------60 %---------70 %---------80 %---------90 %-------100 %

Degree of “territorialness”:
10: Aiming for state power-------Territorial rule--------Non-territorial terrorism (national territory) (“liberated areas”) (against power institutions, structures, societies)
I am not sure if this kind of scales help or make it more difficult. It creates some new problems, e.g. implying that “terrorism” necessarily need to be done by non-state actors, which is obviously wrong. Still, I would argue that the terrorist act – also when it is done by a state or a state agency, openly or covert – intend to destroy power structures, not build new legitimacy.

On this basis, what would be good selection criteria for a case study? My suggestion would be that it can match the basic criteria for a “new war” and that the case contains a strong peace movement with a variety of methods being used. One such case would be Colombia. On the other hand it is also reasonable to chose a worst-case scenario according to the new war characteristics, and look for if, at all, any peace methods were used and what could have had a viability in that situation.

6: A Case Study of War and Nonviolence in Colombia

[Here will the war in Colombia be summarised together with a longer presentation of the strategies, types, frequency and dynamics of nonviolent actions against the war. Is it possible to stop the war in Colombia by working in Colombia only? Is it not necessary to work in Washington? Or to work globally in order to change the global narcotic and arms business in which it takes place?]

7: Possible Nonviolent Actions Against New Wars?

[About here conclusions from the case study concerning possibilities for nonviolent action in situations of globalised wars/terrorism will be presented. What can we learn? What do we need to know more about?]
Tentative suggestions of nonviolent actions in New Wars:

1: To begin with there is a need to decide if the aim is to diminish the war and protect the victims (nonviolent protection), or if the aim is to stop the war (nonviolent resistance). Different methods will be applicable depending on the aim.

2: All the actors that influence the war and conflict need to be mapped. What is their interest in the conflict? Count on that there is a high number of actors on different levels. Each of the big-guys has their vital support-system of smaller groups that sustain them with people, information and money. Here there is a need to gather intelligence from secret and illegal groups, a difficult problem. Not even resource strong secret services like the CIA are able to get all the information they need and they are not sharing what they get. So there is a need for peace actors own intelligence work.

3: The main actors for peace and war need to be analysed in detail. All armed groups are complex and have internal tensions that could be used. Try to find (potential) fractions, e.g. those with bank accounts abroad and those who are force-recruited.

4: Basically there is a need to make a power analysis of the war-lords. How are they getting their money, information, recruits, weapons, food and support – internally, regionally and globally? These links need to be cut and their war-making made non-profitable and difficult to sustain.

5: A work with a constructive program becomes vital, especially when the legitimacy of war-lords and/or the state is lacking and if there is some space to construct such a program without it being destroyed or occupied.

6: A key is early-warning and early-intervention rather than massive intervention in a full blown war.

Other more specific options:

- Undermining the transnational/local financial contributions to the warlords, e.g. freezing of assets, boycott of firms involved. E.g. the diamond trade in wars.
- Get media to the war and document. Try to get the war on the political agenda of the international community since the problem often is that only a couple of wars are able to make it to the agenda.
• Identify those individuals or sub-groups within larger groups that are interested to talk about the situation and/or work for negotiations and peace processes. Try to find door-openers (e.g. Garry Adams in Northern Ireland) that have enough influence within major actors to come with proposals.

• Tell middle-level people within major actors about the unarmed revolutions that have happened around the world. Show them how they could do it and help out with contacts to these successful movements.

• Do fact-finding missions (from legal observers, etc.)

• Press-conference with war-victims via Internet or satellite-phones.

• Twin peace-communities (in e.g. Balkan, Colombia and Israel/Palestine) between those in the same kind of context in order to create mutual support or a different context in order to inspire.

• Collect weapons by offering local villages development projects if they hand in the weapons (i.e. support to communities that take collective responsibility for the peace process, not individuals that arm themselves).

• Work against the arms-industry that earn on these wars and try to find methods to block the illegal flow of weapons to the area through the informal economy or illegal market.

• Cutting of the communication channels of war-organisers, e.g. road-blocs, radio disturbance.

• Promoting desertion and exile (emptying the reserves of soldiers), e.g. leafleting the war area with offers of affluent lives in foreign countries for deserting soldiers. (Make sure it doesn’t produce more soldiers!).

• Meet extreme violence with extreme symbols. E.g. the Palestinians that lifts up their babies in front of Israeli snipers. (This might risk becoming a cynical use of people if adopted as a strategy?!).

• Support local initiatives, however small and unimportant, so they might grow.

• Make a major nonviolent peaceforce intervention with thousands of internationals that moves into the area and stand in protection of victims.
• Exposing the allies of warlords who are dependent on credibility and legitimacy, e.g. through release of fact-reports at corporate meetings, dramatic media stunts with banners.

• Promote, organise and create a global support network of “peace zones” in villages/towns of willing inhabitants in the war area (“islands of civility”).

• Giving international and nonviolent presence, interposition and education in peace zones through organisations like Peace Brigades International, War Resisters International, Christian Peace Makers Team, etc.

• Nonviolent intervention with thousands of foreigners at one and the same time through cooperation with interested nation states, similar to what the anti-person-mine campaign did.

• Offering a massive Marshall plan in return for a complete peace agreement

[SUMMARY is added here: What is really unique for nonviolence of the proposals mentioned?! What is really new nonviolence in the nonviolent options that exist? Is it just the same as before but more specific and limited?]
8: References


Möller, Björn (undated) “Privatization of War and the Regulation of Violence?”, Fill in source, XX


