Transnational Movement Strategies – Some Reflections

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Since the end of the 1990s we are witnessing what is most probably the broadest
movement network mobilisation in world history. This still growing movement is
commonly referred to as the “anti-globalisation movement”, but calls itself the “global
justice movement”. But it is not really a singular movement, rather a “movement of
movements”. This unprecedented world wide movement gives hope for social change of established world structures. It also shows the growing importance and possibility of movements that surpass national and local borders.

This paper tries to understand the existing and possible strategies of transnational movements working for social change, especially those striving for an unarmed or nonviolent change of direct and structural violence, i.e. war and the social structures upholding authoritarian regimes, sexist, racist, capitalist and militarised societies.

In order to understand global and transnational movements we need to create some conceptual clarity. The concept “international”, which is the one we are most accustomed to, refers to relations between nation states as units (inter means between). International relations, like other social relations, can be multidimensional – military, economic, cultural, political or dealing with immigration, information or other issues – but always relations between sovereign states. When heads of states sign agreements, we have international relations. “Transnational” relations, on the other hand, are a quite different phenomenon. Then relations develop through nation states (trans means through or across). There are (multidimensional) flows of information, people or goods that pass through the borders of states without the (sovereign) control of governments or state authorities. When, for example, environmental air-pollution spreads it does not stop and check in at the custom, show passport and fill in immigration papers – it flows right through. The same goes for flows of finance, Internet, criminal networks, or transnational social movements. In a sense transnational relations can be seen as creating big “wholes” in the border. Then, lastly, “global” relations, simply means transnational relations that are not only passing a few state borders but all borders of the globe, all about 200 nation
states that exist today. “Globalisation”, then, is the ongoing transnational process which has the potential to become global.

So, when we talk about “transnational movements” we refer to movements that are discussing, networking and acting across (some nation states) borders without being confined to having relations coordinated between national (movement) branches. When in each country there is a national organisation (uniting local chapters) and these organisations’ cooperation is the only or dominant exchange, we rather talk about international organisations. Transnational organisations and transnational movement activities mix autonomous local and national groups, work-groups, individuals and regional organisations. They are not acting with the nation state as their (sole) organisational reference point.

This is no plain academic or semantic exercise. We have lived in an international system since about the 17th century, organised around the dominant idea of sovereign states (the “Westphalian system”). States still exist and most likely will continue to exist for long time. But the world system has changed since the mid 20th century, today we have a three-folded world structure which is being globalised: international relations, transnational and, for some dimensions, global relations. The finance system is, for example, already global. The stock markets of the world are today united in real time through information technology. On the finance market it does not matter where on earth you are or what the time is, there is only a Now and Here. Financial actions in Beijing are immediately noticed in New York and Mumbai, are met with virtually instant reactions, which in turn are noticed in Beijing the same second they are completed. An interactive finance system exists. And everyone who uses money is affected. Activities are thus
translated into global finance flows, enriching or destroying a corporation or nation state within hours depending on the direction of these global flows. As when people interact face-to-face, actions are done in mutual and instant awareness and accommodation.

Similarly, I propose, is today the situation of transnational social movements. They are through transnational communication networks (Internet, cheap travels, SMS, mobile-phones etc.) acting in an increasingly globalised sense, irrespective of nation state borders. The technological possibility already exists, but in practical reality we will always speak of degrees. The empirical degree of how transnational a movement is will vary – its globalness – some being just “European” or “Western”, or “urban”, while others are digital movements with global communication networks and virtual identities (e.g. the “cultural jammers” like Adbusters).

Still, the major difference today is that a “local to local” relation is practically possible irrespective of where on earth these local places are. Globalisation is exactly a matter of local interconnection ("glocalisation"). A peace village in a war zone in Colombia is able to make direct contact with a local peace group in e.g. Cape Town, South Africa. And, most dramatic, the contact is possible to establish online, i.e. instant interaction. Today it is no major difficulty for most organisations to buy a satellite phone, a digital video camera, the computer hardware (the software is already free), and thus, communicate directly with the world. It will not amount to more than what it costs to bring a few representatives to an international conference. Even if really poor organisations can’t afford it, the cost of making your own TV or news-site has never been this low. And, most importantly, the possibility of suppressing information, to create censorship and uphold a dictatorship, has never been as small as today. That is why even
the major super power, the US, now turn to “total awareness”, i.e. collecting all information (e.g. the Echelon surveillance of phone and Internet traffic), rather than stopping it.

One of the under-researched areas of movement activities is the transnational diffusion of action repertoires, i.e. how local protest routines are transported to other localities and other movements. This lack of knowledge is sad since globalisation makes diffusion more possible. A successful movement intervention, a new form of campaign and action technique in one part of the world might now easier travel to a movement somewhere else, to a movement that maybe is in desperate need of such new inventions. Still, we know that diffusion in reality is more difficult than just a matter of global information flows. A certain social technique is developed in a certain context, in relation to specific actors and historic dynamics. When that (successful) technique is adopted by a movement in another situation somewhere else they need to translate it, i.e. dislocate the idea of the technique from its origin and relocate it in an accommodated form according to the conditions of the new context. That is the reason why it took several decades before the nonviolent repertoire of the Indian liberation movement successfully grew within the US civil rights movement (Chabot 2003). It was not possible – despite that information about the technique was available almost directly – until initial extreme reactions where overcome (like those groups either underestimating or overstating the difference between India and the US). The translation process was a painstaking process of experimentation – of failures and progress – within small dedicated groups (in this case CORE, Congress Of Racial Equality).
METHODS OF TRANSNATIONAL MOVEMENTS

Economic globalisation (of finance, transnational corporations etc.) is facilitated by a state-political globalisation with the creation of multilateral regimes (WTO, IMF, etc.). This globalisation of political economy creates no global state but “governance without government”. But besides this corporate and elite driven “globalisation from above” we also have a globalisation of cultures and civil societies: a “globalisation from below”, driven by heterogeneous networks of transnational social movements. The political expression of these movements is a continuation of old repertoires, new inventions and new application of old methods.

Contemporary movements’ combination of personalization of politics and politicising of the world creates a globalisation of politics: simultaneously expressed by movement convergence and struggles on a “global arena” and political maximalism in the globalised local cultural sphere (Abrahamsson 2003. Vinthagen 2002). By turning not just work, national independence, citizens’ rights, democracy and redistribution, as the social movements of the 19th century, but also traditionally “apolitical” everyday life-forms and “private” way of life, into political arenas, they pierce the micro-world. It is nowadays a political question e.g. what food you eat, what clothes you wear, who makes the dishes at home, with whom and how you make sex. Nothing is apolitical. Politics is everything. Yet, this expansion of politics is often misunderstood by professional politicians as being apolitical because it goes together with movements’ mistrust and opposition of traditional party politics or trade unions. Besides piercing the micro-level of the everyday they are also expanding traditional nation-oriented politics, embracing the macro-world by linking personal and local politics with global questions (Gills 2000).
Unlike classic movements they do not typically form ideologies or political parties with holistic views. The single-issue-orientation of movements is making them competent spokes, who by self-supporting work, specialisation and even research become skilled alternative experts and creators of new cosmologies (Eyerman & Jamison 1991). But particularism and isolation endangers if they do not network with movements oriented around other issues. In the coalition building of “globalisation from below” or the global “movement of movements” and the open space of World Social Forum, it is exactly that issue-networking which is happening. Broad alliances of issue-specialised groups replace the role of parties. At the same time, utopian social change is made visible through the construction of alternative social structures in economic, cultural and political sectors, e.g. through the creation of new “movement societies” on occupied land (Vinthagen 2006). The movements’ celebration of a world which contains “several worlds” simultaneously contradict Thatcher’s infamous “There is no alternative”-speech and the whole neoliberal hegemony.

These movements combine a wide range of political methods. On a practical level this combinatorial repertoire involves boycott, economic sabotage, symbolic confrontations, judicial struggles, the nurturing of their own media structure, development of alternative technology and networking. The system-abiding methods like e.g. lobbying are functional for existing world/national systems since it helps a system adapt to occasional system imbalance and correct malfunctions that otherwise would risk becoming a threat to the survival of the system. System-critical methods like disruptive direct action are usually treated as illegal acts, and met with counter-reactions, since they break system rules and block system functions.
These plural approaches to movement activity are sometimes mutually enforcing while at other times contradictory (Vinthagen 2002). The functions of methods depend on issues, situations and what kind of system and regime is opposed. Since different groups have different priorities about what needs to be done and what methods are legitimate or effective, the movement mobilisation in civil society is reconstructed according to constantly shifting alliances and conflicts; expressed in issue-campaigns and “rainbow coalitions” (Thörn 1997).

What brings this disparate movement of movements together as a somehow united globalisation from below is a combination of two factors of pluralism: pluralism of methods (in the movement named “diversity of tactics”) and political minimalism (named “a movement of one No and many Yes”).

Pluralism of methods means that the movement endorse a diversity of tactics to be used at the same time – lobbying, big peaceful demonstrations, research, civil disobedience, cultural jamming, party work, trade union organising, street theatre and urban riots. These methods are encouraged during global top summit protests as well as local everyday struggles since we anyway do not have any recipe of what methods are most effective. Yet, there are limits to the pluralism. Armed groups and party/government representatives are not included in the WSF network.

The political minimalism, in a similar plural sense, encourages groups to have their own policies and ideology while cooperating on common grounds. The global network is built simply on the lowest common denominator – the rejection of the present globalisation from above, the neoliberal policies of G8, WTO, IMF and the World Bank. During WSF the discussions have created some kind of unity around the demand of debt-
cancellation for the poorest countries, global tax on financial speculation and rejection of
the US-lead war against terror. The most ambitious attempt to build a global agenda so
far is the “Bamako Appeal” from a pre-conference to WSF 2006.\footnote{See \url{http://www.openspaceforum.net/twiki/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=66} (16\textsuperscript{th} July, 2006).} While there is a
conscious rejection of some groups’ proposals to build a global party or a new socialist
international in order to keep the heterogeneity of the network, there are limits here as
well. Not all criticism of neoliberal globalisation is included, e.g. fascist, religious
fundamentalist, cultural traditionalist, ethnic particularism. While that is logical due to
the WSF Charter of Principles (which express support for democracy, pluralism, human
rights, nonviolence etc.) the problem is of course how to draw the line and decide what is
what.\footnote{See \url{http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=4&cd_language=2} (16\textsuperscript{th} July, 2006).}

**TRANSNATIONAL NONVIOLENCE STRATEGIES?**

Even if the transnational capacity of movements has increased with globalisation in
general and information technology in particular, and even though several movements
have increased their transnational activity – the transnationalisation of nonviolent
resistance is not necessarily increasing, due to national and state oriented strategies and
frames. There has been some development of strategies for nonviolent action campaigns
since Mohandas Gandhi, e.g. by Ackerman & Kruegler, Burrowes, Lakey, Martin, Moyer
and Sharp. The tradition of nonviolent action, even before Gandhi and the Indian
liberation struggle, has the advantage of being oriented towards not only conventional
political struggle (i.e. the state and the law), but as well everyday struggles, root-
problems of political issues, social work, personal development and structural change.
That, actually, makes the nonviolent action form of politics more suited to the global condition of societies. Yet, the potential is poorly observed or developed.

While Gandhi was nuanced and multiple in his approach to nonviolence and social change (making e.g. resistance, social work and personal change equally important, or combining strategic effectiveness and ethical principles, or combining political, economic and cultural change) nonviolent action theory has become comparatively reductionist, statist and one-dimensional.

The main orientation of nonviolent strategy development and (public) movement discussion, campaigning and concern, has been to compete with armed and legalistic forms of conventional politics. Simply put, to be more effective than the two main alternative strategies of political struggle: the revolutionary guerrillas and the reformist parties. More effective in producing democratisation of liberal or authoritarian regimes, as well as reduction of exploitation, war, discrimination, or such similar goals by different (nonviolent) means – but via the same political channel as guerrillas and parties: the sovereign nation state. That is an increasing handicap in a globalising world.

In developing global strategies we have at least three problems. There is a fundamental problem with the prevalence of groups without a real strategy at all; those with only a tactical repertoire and undeveloped assumptions of social change which simply react to events. Such opportunistic movements will have even greater problems to achieve social change and spread their knowledge to others since they are not making their strategy explicit, thus making strategy development and diffusion difficult. Among those who do have an explicit strategy two other problems exist. Firstly, if strategy is built simply on what has worked for others before it will not be able to take
into account a changing world (colonisation, modernisation, globalisation etc.). Secondly there is a problem if explicit strategies are built on unfounded theories of social change. In order to assess the conditions of global strategies we then need to reflect on different approaches to social change.

SOCIAL CHANGE AND STRATEGIC THINKING

“Change” in society is a new historical idea – at least progressive change or change by intervention of humans. Earlier people believed only in a divine and cosmic order, eternal harmony, inevitable destiny and evil catastrophes or accidents. Modernity, on the other hand, is essentially a matter of rational social change, the assumption that we are masters of our destiny.

“Social change” is here understood as a range of events which after some time replace a social structure or social unit with new structures or units. But it is not enough that just something change. Even major change processes might be cyclic repetitions of the same pattern as the reappearance of seasons during the year. Social change range from the organising of social activities in a group to the historical change of humankind as a whole where acts of individuals don’t matter, as e.g. the long change waves on a world level of 30-50 years described by Fernand Braudel (“Long durée”).

Movements’ aim of deliberate social change concerns the choice of strategy and tactics. “Tactics” is with Clausewitz here understood as the means used and the plan of how to win a certain battle, while “strategy” is a matter of how to use the battles in order to win the war. In certain nonviolent battles it might be tactically wise to use legal and educational tools in order to raise the awareness of people, while it would be futile to use
it as an effective strategy for transforming an oppressive and exploitative system and the class which benefits on it.

Our development of strategy is connected to our approach to social change. We might understand social change as governed by universal laws which when uncovered predict change, similar to natural science. On the other hand we might believe that social change is only possible to describe with the help of contextually developed theories which help us to understand partial and local change after that they occurred. There are good reasons to believe something in-between. Firstly, change seems possible to influence since basically determinism is possible only in closed systems and all societies, according to the foremost social system scientist, Niklas Luhmann, are open systems. Secondly, social change seems to be inevitably incoherent and extremely complex. Since interaction effects and feedback from six billion humans in the open world system are becoming increasingly instant through information technology, both prediction and the idea of a determining causal factor (like ideology, technology, economic relations or frustration) seems unfounded. Several decisive factors might interplay making change basically incoherent and complex. Nationalism, class conflicts, acculturation, diffusion, demography, environmental conditions, migration or rationalisation (bureaucratisation) are some of the proposed main factors behind social change, all of them with supportive empirical evidence. But even if social change happens without any master mind, certain change might still be intelligible and more or less likely compared to other possible changes.

Yet the strongest evidence for why social change is more complicated than assumed by movement activists, state administrators, conspiracy groups and
revolutionaries is the simple fact that even social scientists are unable to predict even major changes in societies. The biggest revolutionary changes in history have happened as a surprise to most. The unexpected revolution in Eastern Europe 1989-1990 is a prime example among several: a major social change which can’t be explained by reference only to Gorbatjov, economic or military factors. Like all these factors glasnost and perestroika where decisive yet an official expression of ideas and reform struggles within communism since the 1950s. Those who study social forces from above did not see what was coming while those who worked with the east-west dialogue and transnational movement cooperation knew that a transformation was on the way. But the speed to which dissidents found themselves in government positions surprised everyone.

CLASSIC SOCIAL CHANGE THEORIES

Making strategies of social change is difficult if change is complex, incoherent and unpredictable. Still people try and there is some scope for influencing other actors. Implicitly all strategic thinking builds on the idea that we have the ability to effect and control social change according to our goals and values. It is possible to understand different strands of social change theories according to which society sector they emphasise as the most important one (politics, economy or culture), who is the main change agent and through what methods change is effected.

If you understand the market economy as the main driving force behind social change it might be in the socialist version of Marx or Wallerstein (the logic of the economic system as a whole) or a neoliberal belief in the rational egoism of the “economic man” (the particularistic logic of economic individuals and organisations).
On the other hand you might believe that the main force is state politics and the military, built on the realist belief in the power egoism and security orientation of all actors. In the conservative tradition of Hobbes this might be understood as the security provision of the state provided by its citizen’s submission to the state monopoly of violence, or some international version of (neo) realism. In a socialist version of Lenin, Mao or Che Guevara this realism might as well be mirrored in rebellious strategies to make a revolutionary guerrilla war. Or, in the Sharpian perspective, the realist approach might be expressed through protest, non-cooperation and intervention towards the state and military.

As a third option you might understand the civil society or cultural sector as the most important in driving social change. Through education, voluntary cooperation and ideology people change their societies: in the version of political liberalism the liberal democracy regulate a world society of mutual and plural interdependence between voluntary organisations and cooperation projects – in the socialist version of Hardt and Negri the communicative and intellectual production of the “multitude” is able to fight the exploitation by “empire” and create true global democracy.

Fourthly and, in this simple scheme, lastly, there is the possibility that the interaction between these three sectors – the market economy, the state/military and the civil society – is the driving force. In Habermas’ optimist version we will understand change as a matter of the struggle between the political-economic system and the communicative civil society (the reduction of citizens to producers, consumers and clients by the system colonization vs. the liberation of citizens through institutions of communicative rationality). In Foucault’s pessimistic version we get the main actors of
the three sectors entangled by plural networks of power techniques in a society of discipline where no sovereign centre is in control.

When it comes to the question of who is the main change agent suggestions have varied from the rationality in itself as an historic Subject (Hegel’s “Spirit”), the working class (Marx’s self-conscious working class, Lenin’s avant-garde Party, the Syndicalist trade union, or spontaneous self-organisation by individuals of the working class according to autonomous Marxism, or Mao’s small-scale farmers and farm-workers), black or non-European ethnicities (e.g. the Black Panther Party or Pan-Africanism), women (in radical, essentialist or separatist feminism, e.g. political lesbianism) or the poor in service of God (Christian Liberation Theology in e.g. Latin America). In this tradition of privileging one or the other suppressed group, Gramsci stands in his own right as someone who believes in the power alliances of main society actors, basically one from each society sector (hegemonic blocs and contra-hegemonic blocs).

When it comes to methods Gene Sharp has outlined 198 different nonviolent action forms which throughout history already has been applied, broadly divided into three categories: protest, non-cooperation (political, economical and social) and intervention. Other classifications exist but these are the ones which are fundamental for the Sharpian paradigm which still is dominating the understanding of unarmed resistance (exceptions are e.g. Burrowes and Martin). Let’s discuss these as building bricks in unarmed strategies.

CURRENT NONVIOLENT ACTION STRATEGIES
Ackerman & Kruegler (1994) have probably developed the most advanced set of strategic principles built on the Sharpian paradigm. In summary they advice movements to: formulate functional objectives, develop organisational strength, secure access to critical material resources, cultivate external assistance, expand the repertoire of sanctions, attack the opponents’ strategy for consolidating control, mute the impact of the opponents’ violent weapons, alienate opponents from expected bases of support, maintain nonviolent discipline, assess events and options in light of levels of strategic decision making, adjust offensive and defensive operations according to the relative vulnerabilities of the protagonists, sustain continuity between sanctions, mechanisms, and objectives.

The primary assumption is that there exist an opponent with a sovereign command-centre and a rational subjectivity – the regime – dependent on “bases of support”, thus possible to influence.

**STRATEGY BUILT ON “REALITY”**

On a fundamental level – in terms of ontology and epistemology of reality – strategy is about how societies and individuals are able to change. The main weakness of the state focus, and other classic strategies of social change is that it builds on an unconvincing world view. Classic strategy is typically developed according to a thinking in terms of solid units (states, organisations, politics/culture/economics, societies or individuals), each driven by their own individual and unitary motivation/interest hierarchy (material or idealistic). The interaction between these interest units is then supposed to be governed by a behaviouristic logic of cause and effect (stimuli and response) and rational utility calculations (“rational choice”). Societies as well as individual persons are viewed as
unitary entities in a chess game. Today, the crisis of modernist and positivist science
have, together with global processes, destabilised not only state borders but also the
fundamental understanding of interaction between cultures, of how social processes occur
(e.g. with postcolonial and poststructural theories of fragmented subjects and multiple
power networks). Generally speaking there is today an emphasis on how parts,
dimensions or aspects within perceived “units” are mutually interconnected and
constituting, how social processes are fundamentally plural and dynamic.

So, crudely put, nonviolent strategy is confined within a (western) modernist
mind-set and has in a creative move turned the state and war strategists Machiavelli and
Clausewitz upside down. Yet, strategic thinking has remained within that power realist
world view, despite (or maybe because of) this innovative interpretation. Even worse is
that Sharp – who still has a paradigmatic influence on the strategic thinking – did turn
Gandhi upside down. For Gandhi ethics, politics and reality were a unity and his
nonviolent morality resulted, through political experimentation with reality, in the
nonviolent technique and way of life. With Sharp the technical effectiveness of
nonviolent action became a morality of effective technique (Holm 1978: Vinthagen
2005). If the behaviouristic, causal, amoral and utilitarian techniques were really
nonviolently effective in social processes it would not be a problem. But at least
according to a post/late-modern sociology – with postcolonialism, Foucault, Bourdieu etc.
– the Sharpian strategic world-view is not founded on reality.

As a theoretical experiment, let me make a tentative suggestion of what strategy
for transnational and nonviolent social movements’ contemporary global sociology
would advice. Since, by its nature, it becomes impossible to give a single coherent
framework of effective principles, we will have to satisfy with guidelines for strategies in
the plural sense. Nevertheless, that does not mean that we could not build our strategies
on scientific knowledge, on the contrary, empirical case studies and systematic
comparison, as well as theoretical development of new models are possible and
necessary. We just have to understand that we are not there yet, far from it.

GUIDELINES OF GLOBAL NONVIOLENCE STRATEGIES

As we have seen globalisation demands a very different approach to strategy and
nonviolent campaigning. In general we need to build our strategy on a combination of our
analysis of globalisation, nonviolent action, power and social change. With a more
theoretically sound and empirically grounded understanding of these different
phenomena and their combinations, we will be better equipped to build successful
strategies of transnational nonviolent movement work. Otherwise basic mistakes will be
made. The power analysis, for example, needs to look at the de facto power pillars of the
regime in this specific case and context, not just – as has often uncritically been done
before – a basic application of Sharp’s consent theory of power (cf Burrowes 1996).

When developing strategies we need to take into account a number of conditions
growing out of multidimensional globalisation:

- The existence of a global economy and the dominance of the market and
  transnational corporations (even in terms of privatised war activities)
- The growing importance of a global IT-network and media.
- The absence of a global state parallel to an increasing number of
  multilateral regimes.
• The increasing interconnectedness between local/national contexts, conflicts and issues.

• The degree of globalness of a phenomenon will vary according to context (and is basically an empirical question). A specific process or issue will sometimes in some societies be very globalised, at other nearly not at all.

Taken together these conditions points towards certain guidelines of how to do transnational nonviolent struggles. Some tentative suggestions regarding such strategies and their development are:

• The diffusion of nonviolent repertoires demands skilled accommodation to local contexts, culture and history (dislocation from old context and relocation to the new).

• We need to create global coordination and alliances between different struggles and people while respecting difference.

• We need a combination of the local and global: with local bases of global struggles.

• Understanding and facilitating social change today demands a multilevel approach (local, national, regional and global).

• A renewed economic resistance beyond national trade unions, UN economic sanctions and individual boycotts is necessary (e.g. LOGO-attacks and collective consumer actions).
• The development of nonviolent economic alternatives is needed in order to replace the violent/oppressive sides of contemporary capitalism (e.g. World Forum of Alternatives, Fair Trade, Credit Unions and alternative currency like LETS).

• We need to develop new forms of democratic institutions on all levels that complement/replace the weakened national parliaments. We also need, in the short run, to support some selected multilateral regimes (maybe the UN-General Assembly, African Union or UNDP?), while rejecting others (or support some activity and reject other). Here the Local Municipal Assembly of WSF is an important network.

• We need to mobilise campaigns through the World Social Forum and its plural global network and link other movement networks to it, as well as local groups.

The main tentative conclusion of this theoretical exploration of transnational movement strategies for nonviolent struggles is that struggles need to be globally communicated, developed and coordinated, yet applied and translated according to local contexts. Thus, diversity of tactics is necessary since issues, battles, contexts etc are varied, but that diversity need to be within some kind of common grand strategic framework (of e.g. resisting oppression, respecting difference, protection of life, constructing alternatives etc.) in order to be a global movement for social change.
References


