Book Reviews

***Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique*. By David Couzens Hoy. (Cambridge, MA and London: MIT Press, 2004).**

If structuralism is followed by poststructuralism, then what follows poststructuralism? In his latest book, David Hoy suggests a new paradigm he calls post-critique. The idea of post-critique, to which I will return further below, is built around the concept of critical resistance – the actual title of the book. Hoy gets to the heart of the idea of resistance via an engaging and deeply informed discussion of a number of authors who often find themselves cramped together under the label poststructuralism.

His analysis gains a unique perspective through its emphasis on *critical* resistance, which Hoy differentiates from resistance *per se* by its emancipatory goals and effects vis-à-vis forms of domination. Resistance, Hoy notes, need not necessarily attempt or yield emancipation; it is only resistance informed by a critique of and directed at domination that may do so. Additionally, in order to qualify as critical, resistance "must be able to identify its injuries and to articulate its grievances" (6). Hoy asks us to think about resistance in multiple dimensions and distinguishes between political, ethical, and social resistance, stressing that "resistance is both an activity and an attitude" (9), thus aiming to avoid splits between theory and practice.

Hoy's initial interest lies with the way various authors have accounted for the sheer possibility of resistance. The starting point of his analysis is therefore an examination of what he calls (non-metaphysical) "ontologies of resistance" (12, 186) in Nietzsche, Foucault, and Bourdieu – the former being regarded by Hoy as the founding father of poststructuralism *avant la lettre*. Ultimately, however, the question that gives the argument of the book its overall thrust is, in my view, "how to distinguish resistance that is emancipatory from other forms, such as resistance that is reactionary" (5). These questions being Hoy's guiding thread, it becomes clear that the interlocutors to his argument are neo-Kantians, first and foremost Habermas, and to a lesser extent neo-Marxists like Eagleton and Jameson. Hoy himself refers to the book as a "prequel" (12) to *Critical Theory*, published in 1994, in which he and Thomas McCarthy engaged in a rich and illuminating exchange between a squarely neo-Kantian and a neo-Nietzschean position. *Critical Resistance* is a prequel in that it makes the initial case for the poststructuralists; it anticipates the gravest concerns voiced from neo-Kantians, who typically see the former project as self-defeating to the extent that its holistic and gloomy descriptions of society, which to some extent echo the sociological disillusionment of systems theory, marginalize agency and put the mere possibility of resistance in jeopardy. Beyond that, it is the notorious issue of an alleged lack of normative foundations in the poststructuralists' account of resistance that is the most troubling for neo-Kantians, prompting, for example, Habermas to (in-)famously charge Foucault's genealogy with relativism and crypto-normativism.

It is one of the many merits of the book that it takes these concerns seriously and confronts them directly by discussing social *ontologies* of *critical* resistance. Hoy is uniquely well equipped to present the case for the poststructuralist (or post-critical) position to the neo-Kantians in particular. Not only does he have an intricate knowledge of the diverse issues involved; his style of writing balances nuance and detail with lucidity in an admirable fashion. That is to say, far from being either an apologetic or a polemic, the plain argumentative style of the book extends an invitation to neo-Kantians to enter a productive and possibly

Constellations Volume 14, No 2, 2007.

mutually beneficial exchange with the emerging framework of post-critique. Furthermore, the emphasis Hoy places on the ethical turn in Derrida's work and the later Foucault's distinction between power and domination, both of which have a somewhat de-radicalizing effect on their respective positions, also speaks to Hoy's intention of providing accounts that could possibly ease some if not all the concerns raised by neo-Kantians.

Nevertheless, this does not mean that Hoy overly streamlines *the* poststructuralist position. On the contrary, the book covers a wide array of authors (Nietzsche, Foucault, Bourdieu, Levinas/Derrida, and Laclau/Mouffe) and addresses issues that range from the disturbing spectre of human mortality to the face of the other, from the plasticity of *habitus* to the value of interpretation, from the epistemological pitfalls of false consciousness to the significance of biopower. It is to Hoy's credit that he abstains from reifying the multiplicity of positions he views as viable candidates for an emerging framework of post-critique into a monolithic bloc. Instead he calls for a "sufficiently flexible" conceptualization of post-critique and emphasizes that the goal is not to synthesize various accounts of resistance into "what resistance really is" (18), but to leave the diversity and one might even say disparity of these approaches intact while pointing to some family resemblances.

What ties Hoy's multi-faceted narrative together is the theme of the body/embodiment, which he sees as the Ariadne's thread running through the often labyrinthine works of all the authors discussed. Thus, for example, the body in Nietzsche is a metaphor of conflicting interpretations (51), in Foucault it is the contested site of domination/normalization and resistance (67–69), in Bourdieu it figures prominently in the notion of *habitus*, and Derrida and Levinas address the mortality of the body and the presence of the face of the other as ethical predicaments and obligations of existential proportions.

Hoy particularly emphasizes two effects that the focus on the body in these approaches has with regard to critical resistance. On the one hand, it serves as a reminder that the critical perspective is always already situated or embodied. While, according to Hoy, none of the authors discussed would "necessarily reject universal principles" (4), their starting point is a concrete social situation, a particular perspective grounded in a particular experience. The body, always embedded in a concrete situation and characterized by finitude and mortality, signifies this preference for the particular as a starting point for (post-)critique, in which *phronesis* and practical/tacit knowledge play important roles. While the body thus enables a particular form of critique and resistance that self-consciously emerge from a particular context, Hoy contends that it can also come close to undermining the sheer possibility of critical resistance: "The strategy of moving the body from the periphery of our theories to their centers is not without dangers. The more pervasive and inaccessible the practices of bodily socialization are made out to be, the less criticism and resistance may seem to be possible or worthwhile" (123). In other words, it is the challenge to a rationalist notion of autonomy that turns the body into an ambivalent resource for critical resistance. Hoy insists on a rudimentary version of autonomy that is linked to a notion of freedom because otherwise it is difficult to see how subjects/agents can possibly counter the anonymous forces that inscribe themselves as deeply in the body as, for example, Foucault and Bourdieu contend. For example, with regard to the latter, Hoy points to the extent that Bourdieu acknowledges the possibility of a "conscious control of the habitus" if only on the basis of a rigorous socioanalysis that brings the influence of the former "out of the tacit background into the explicit foreground" (123).

Given the limited scope of a review, I cannot do justice to the rich accounts Hoy provides in the various chapters, each of which ends with "reflections that transcend poststructuralism" (17) and thus point toward post-critique. Instead I will briefly discuss the notion of

"deconstructive genealogy" that Hoy, borrowing from the later Derrida, introduces in the Postscript of the book as one possible shape a post-critical project could take on. In explaining this idea, Hoy draws on most of the authors and some of the concepts discussed, the emphasis obviously being on Foucault and Derrida. The genealogical aspect of this form of post-critique amounts to a thoroughly historicizing view of the present, thus denaturalizing the existing order of things based on the demonstration that it has been different in the past and therefore could be different in the future. While this destabilizing operation opens up a space of transformative action, Hoy highlights the importance of self-reflexivity at this stage in the (post-)critical process. That is, in deciding which course of action to take there is an ethical responsibility to stay clear of 'good conscience' and smugness about the justification of these actions. For Hoy, this signifies the deconstructive aspect of post-critique: "I take it that Derrida objects to the complete self-confidence of the critic who seems to have no doubts about where society is going" (229). This means that "post-critique is thus self-critique all the way down" (228). Finally, with regard to the vexing issue of how to normatively judge various types of resistance, Hoy to some extent draws on the later Foucault's distinction between domination and power. Deconstructive genealogy, thus, has to steer a course between the Scylla of monism ("one right theory") and the Charibdis of anarchism/nihilism ("anything goes"/"nothing matters"). That is to say that critical resistance aims at a healthy pluralism in which games of power can be played with the least amount of domination possible, paraphrasing Foucault. This is as far as Hoy is willing to commit with regard to what comes close to an *a priori* normativity. Beyond this point, situated genealogies and *phronesis* have to provide the dim normative light of post-critique that intentionally is to deprive us of the brightness of self-certainty regarding our normative goals.

Doubtlessly, this cogent exposition of post-critique warrants a full-scale examination and response from a neo-Kantian perspective that lie far beyond the scope of a review. Nevertheless, let me close with a couple of remarks formulated from such a point of view. What deserves attention, first of all, is what strikes me as a surprising congruency between many aspects of post-critique and, for example, Habermasian discourse theory. Habermasian discourses are in part designed to be devices of continual self-examination (values we hold to be appropriate for us and norms thought to be right for everyone) through exposure to the view of others, and their findings are, strictly speaking, tentative and open to re-evaluation. This extends to the consensuses arrived at in discourses as well as to the rules of discourse themselves which Habermas formulates in a spirit of adamant fallibilism – in contrast to some kind of ultimate justification (*Letztbegründung*) as it is attempted in Transcendental Pragmatics. Thus, the self-reflexivity Hoy calls for is deeply entrenched in this approach. The sheer fact that post-critique acknowledges the "need to reflect on and to posit universal principles" (12), even if they are just weak universals like Derrida's un-deconstructable 'messianicity' or 'justice,' brings it close to the position of Habermas that conceptualizes universals as equally weak 'counterfactual idealizations' in later works.

These correspondences notwithstanding, there remain, of course, important tensions. The issue of normativity is one of them. Hoy's defense of a healthy pluralism as suggested above can be questioned along several lines in my view. Why is reversibility (power) preferable to irreversible asymmetry (domination)? Because the latter denies freedom, but that just begs the question on what account one ought to take the side of freedom and whether a purely formal definition of it will suffice. Is a xenophobic far-right movement in Sweden engaging in *critical* resistance when it tries to disrupt the social-democratic hegemony of the country in the name of their 'freedom' to maintain cultural homogeneity and fight what

they perceive to be excessive immigration? Or, to be more blunt, is the pedophile who engages in sexual acts with minors critically resisting a form of domination, i.e., a rigid regime of laws and norms that criminalize certain identities and patterns of action? It seems to me that a purely formal response to the question of normativity suggesting that resistance against whatever crystallized form of asymmetry (domination) is *ipso facto* critical remains unsatisfactory.

If I understand Hoy's position correctly, we cannot expect this point to be determined *a priori* and the normative burden in concrete cases such as the Swedish movement and the pedophile ought to be shouldered by a situated genealogy and *phronesis*. However, *phronesis* that is not informed by (weak) universalist principles or norms might easily add up to a judgment that simply reproduces contextual biases and prejudices. And while post-critique acknowledges the significance of those principles, as mentioned above, in Hoy's substantial argument they are, for the most part, sidelined.

At the same time, the notion of a self-conscious *phronesis* that Hoy derives from Derrida might serve as just one of many examples where neo-Kantians may find post-critique instructive. After all, despite the sophistication that is to be found in Habermas's framework of justifying norms through discourse, the *application* of conflicting norms to a particular situation remains a largely unresolved question, given that discourses of application that Habermas refers to as a procedure for norm application appear to stand in a problematically circular relation to justificatory discourses. Here, embracing a Derridean *phronesis* as an alternative starting point, as Hoy suggests, may be more productive.

As these brief remarks hopefully indicate, Hoy's masterly readings of the main figures of poststructuralism and his introduction of post-critique as a new paradigm provide ample room for discussion and take the ongoing debate between neo-Kantians and neo-Nietzscheans to a new level. If this debate yields more novel and important insights in the future, a lot of the credit will have to be attributed to David Hoy's *Critical Resistance*.

Thomas Biebricher is Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Florida, Gainesville. He is the author of *Selbstkritik der Moderne. Foucault und Habermas im Vergleich* (2006).

***Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions of Islamism*. By Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 2005.)**

When the Shah of Iran was deposed on January 16, 1979, many Western and in particular French intellectuals greeted the event with cautious optimism. The massive urban uprising of several million people galvanized by a coalition of secular Marxists, Islamic clerics and leftist nationalists seemed to represent, to onlookers in the West, a significant new type of spontaneous and inclusive collective political movement. However, any enthusiasm for the revolution quickly waned as the coalition of secular and religious forces fell apart rapidly, turning into a form of clerical authoritarianism that was increasingly brutal in its suppression of political and religious opponents, women and other minorities. Some intellectuals were of course suspicious of the movement even prior to the toppling of the Shah. The eminent Islamic expert, Maxime Rodinson warned in December 1978 that the dominant trend within the revolutionary forces was "unquestionably a type of archaic fascism." On January 22 the historian Le Roy Ladurie was already comparing the "chauvinist Islamism" of Khomeini and the clerics to the French Catholic fanatics who massacred thousands of protestants at the

end of the sixteenth century. And by early March, when the oppressive nature of the regime was manifest in its summary executions of gays and its abrupt revocation of women's rights, prominent feminists, including Kate Millet and Simone de Beauvoir, publicly denounced Khomeini and his fundamentalist regime.

Michel Foucault was the only French intellectual who did not join in any of these public condemnations and continued to idealize the revolution as the expression of a new form of "political spirituality" long after its reliance on terror was clear. In the period leading up to the revolution, Foucault visited Iran and met frequently with French and Iranian anti-Shah activists as well as with Khomeini himself during his exile in Paris. He also wrote regular reports for one of Italy's most respected daily newspapers, the *Corriere della sera*, on the events unfolding in Iran. In these columns, Foucault's admiration for the Iranian uprising centers upon the extent to which it represents a political movement that takes nothing from the principles of Western thinking. The anti-modernist sentiments catalyzed by the curious confluence of religion and leftist thought contravened Marxist stipulations on the necessarily progressive and class nature of revolutionary movement. Far from being the 'opium of the people,' religion in the context of the parasitic modernity of the Shah's regime was a galvanizing force and Foucault was particularly fascinated by Shiite rituals of martyrdom that were central to this emergent, and in his view, radical political spirituality.

While Foucault's naïve romanticization of the Iranian revolution embroiled him in huge controversy in France, many of his English speaking biographers have tended to downplay the episode as a lapse of judgment at odds with the political orientation of the rest of his work. Afary and Anderson argue, to the contrary, that rather than being anomalous, Foucault's views on Iran are predictable insofar as they consistent with other troubling tendencies that run through his entire oeuvre. Unlike his contemporaries, Foucault never engaged with the issue of colonialism and had a simplified grasp of the Muslim world derived mainly from his visits as a 'sex tourist' to Tunisia. His idea, not entirely unfounded, that Muslim societies were more tolerant of sexual relations between men than Christian ones rests, in Afary and Anderson's view, on a misguided refusal to see that the toleration of homoerotic culture is far from being the equivalent of the social and legal recognition sought by gay movements in the West. Such undeveloped ideas also inform his essentially apolitical analysis of the Iranian situation which he repeatedly characterized as an undifferentiated and "irreducible" populist force rather than as an uneasy alliance between different ideological factions. Afary and Anderson argue, rightly, that this exoticization of Iranian culture and, in particular, his fascination with the discourse of martyrdom, is yet another example of the problematic fetishization of liminal experiences that runs throughout Foucault's thought from his early work on madness to his final work on ethics of the self. The Heideggerian-Orientalist subtext to his own anti-Enlightenment sentiments leads him to set up a simplistic distinction between the modernity and its others where traditional societies – Iran, Tunisia, ancient Greece, pre-capitalist Europe – are reified and held up as some kind of antidote to the problems of the West. Perhaps, most problematic of all, is the way in which Foucault's profound and much noted indifference to issues of gender underpinned his extraordinarily naïve assessment of the Iranian situation. Afary and Anderson compellingly document how Foucault's persistent failure to register the blatant repression of women that started almost as soon as Khomeini came to power lies at the heart of his political misjudgment. It is only in his final public statement in *Le Monde* on May 11, 1979 that he makes a grudging and passing reference to the problem of "the subjugation of women and so on." From then until his death in 1984, Foucault said no more on the issue of Iran.

Afary and Anderson's book is a compelling and important contribution to the mass of secondary literature on Foucault. In a valuable appendix, they bring together all of Foucault's articles and public statements on Iran and the responses of other French intellectuals to his increasingly beleaguered position. Their account of the events leading up to the uprising and its immediate aftermath is lucid and enthralling. So too is their overall argument that Iran represents not a blip in Foucault's views but the logical extension of his more general Nieztschean tendencies. In comparison with the mass of textual evidence considered in relation to Foucault's views on Iran, their comparative discussion of the rest of his work is frustratingly slight and undeveloped. This means that, at points, some of their arguments are asserted rather than demonstrated, for example, the rather startling claim that, for Foucault, Khomeini personified a Nietzschean will to power. This is not the only overstatement that occasionally undermines an otherwise excellent book. They argue, for example, that the softening of Foucault's views, in his final years, towards the legacy of the Enlightenment was the result of the public chastening he received over Iran. There might be an element of truth to this but it is a rather reductive reading of his work that fails to consider his reworking of the critical ethos of the Enlightenment in conjunction with his contemporaneous analysis of neo-liberal techniques of government and his attempt to formulate some notion of resistant agency in the idea of an aesthetics of existence. Similarly, while there is some force to their argument that the final work on Ancient Greek ethics of the self exemplifies the troubling Orientalist tendency to uncritically celebrate the 'exotic other,' it overlooks the significance of Foucault's genealogical method which uses the past to denaturalize the present. It also does not sufficiently acknowledge the huge influence that Foucault's work on sexuality has had for progressive political movements, especially gay and queer activism. Nonetheless, Afary and Anderson's book is an important, engaging, and powerfully argued contribution to a field where it was hard to imagine that anything more of interest could be said.

Lois McNay is University Reader in Politics, Somerville College, University of Oxford. She is the author of *Foucault and Feminism: Power, Gender and the Self* (1992) and *Gender and Agency: Reconfiguring the Subject in Feminist and Social Theory* (2000).

***The Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*. Edited by Fred Rush. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.)**

It is no easy task to provide a representative picture of a complex intellectual tradition like Critical Theory, but this is exactly what Fred Rush and his team of collaborators set out to do. Part of the problem is that it is not easy to provide a clear definition of Critical Theory. *Narrowly*, it refers to several generations of philosophers and social theorists associated with the Frankfurt School, the focus of the present work. One of the defining moments here is the distinction between critical theory and traditional theory, where the former has the specific practical purpose of seeking human emancipation. In its classical version, Horkheimer sketched emancipation as the attempt to liberate human beings from circumstances of enslavement. Yet such a vision of emancipation and liberation has provided the platform for many *broader* "critical theories" today, including feminism, critical race theory, and some forms of postcolonial criticism.

Since its inception in the 1920s, Critical Theory in the narrower sense has undergone many changes, both within and between generations. It has become common to divide Critical Theory roughly into three generations. The first generation, including figures such as Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, Benjamin, Fromm, and Pollock, were not always in

agreement. The second generation, dominated by the towering figure of Habermas, has positioned itself in many ways opposite the first; while the third generation, consisting of Axel Honneth and others, is still finding their way in the post-Cold War era of cultural plurality and the end of "grand narratives" (337). Against this background, Critical Theory could be characterized by a certain diversity and plurality that contribute to its richness, but also pose barriers for understanding and orientation. The challenge is then, according to Rush, to respect the richness (the diverse intellectual influences on Critical Theory as well as the technical vocabulary of each thinker), but also to focus on the core philosophical concerns that are shared by Critical Theory as an intellectual tradition (1–2).

Rush organizes the book in three parts. The first part (chapters 1–8) is more historical. Chapters 9–11 are more systematic, dealing with issues such as mass culture, politics, and the relation between Critical Theory and poststructuralism. Finally, there are two chapters (12 and 13) that are also systematic, but with the explicit aim of showing the continued relevance and future prospects of Critical Theory.

Rush opens the more historical part of the compilation with his own contribution on the conceptual grounding of early Critical Theory. He starts with Horkheimer's defense of Critical Theory within a broad Marxist and Kantian framework (9–10). Rush then provides an interpretation of Horkheimer's inaugural lecture, with its distinction between different kinds of idealism and materialism, and his very important 1937 essay on the difference between traditional and critical theory. Apart from Horkheimer, Rush also sketches Marcuse's and Adorno's early conceptual grounding of Critical Theory in close relation to Horkheimer, but with important nuances (27–35). Although this is a fine introductory chapter, it tends to be a bit technical and based on well-known material. Michael Rosen's chapter concentrates on the complex relationship between Benjamin and Adorno. It is a fine scholarly essay, but does not bring forward anything substantially new about their disagreements (43). Eventually, Rosen makes a distinction between Adorno's Hegelian-Marxist versus Benjamin's Kantian-Marxist aesthetics (53–55). Julian Roberts, on his part, focuses on one of the seminal texts of Critical Theory, Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment*. This is done, firstly, by comparing it with Popper's *The Open Society and its Enemies* and Lukács's *The Destruction of Reason*, both also written at the end of the Second World War. Roberts comes to the conclusion that the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* "had a greater effect than either of the other two. . ." (58). He then provides a careful reading of the book's central arguments, covering the mythical nature of enlightenment, the issue of alienation, *hic et nunc*, conceptual equivalence, instrumental reason, power, and mimetic projection. In a final section, Roberts correctly indicates that *Dialectic* is not merely a pessimistic text, but provides three possible strategies to escape false enlightenment, namely healthy sexuality, justice in the form of the particular, and art (69–72). Joel Whitebook is known for his perceptive interpretations of the influence of Freud's psychoanalysis on Critical Theory. It comes thus as no surprise that he describes Freud, in addition to Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Weber, as one of the "foundation stones" of early Critical Theory (74). The value of Whitebook's contribution is to provide a fine reconstruction of Freud's influence on Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas (with the latter moving away from psychoanalysis by preferring Piaget and Kohlberg's development psychology) (89–96).

In his systematic-historical reconstruction of the concepts of revolution and dialectic in Critical Theory, Raymond Geuss indicates how these concepts (especially the former) had a hold on European imagination for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (104). With regard to revolution, Geuss refers to aspects such as radical change, necessity and prediction, directionality, and the role of Marx and Lenin. When it comes to dialectics, he

traces this concept from Marx and Lenin to Marcuse and Adorno (130–36). For Geuss too, Adorno was not just a pessimist thinker, but also glimpsed the possibility of the good life in an emancipated society: everyone should have enough to eat, "be able to be different without anxiety," and be free from the principle of productivity (135). Jay Bernstein then provides a masterly reconstruction of Adorno's aesthetic theory. He first defends philosophical aesthetics as a theory of reason, then moves on to explore the complex relationship between Marxism and aesthetics (139–45). He then sketches accounts of the double character, nature, and the truth content of art. These classical themes in Adorno indicate for Bernstein a modernist art that fosters conceptions of knowing, reasoning, and acting that go against their rationalized versions.

Moishe Postone focuses on the relation between Critical Theory and political economy, a theme neglected in most of the secondary literature. The issue here is the epochal transformation of capitalism in the first part of the twentieth century, which comes down to a supersession of a liberal capitalism by a new bureaucratized or state capitalism (165–66). Postone reconstructs the important debates between Pollock, Neumann, and Kirchheimer on state capitalism, law, and the Marxian concept of labor. He ends his contribution with a brief sketch on the transformation of political economy in Critical Theory after 1937 (181–90). In the last of the historical chapters, Habermas finally makes his entrance. Kenneth Baynes does not use the opportunity to situate Habermas with regard to his forerunners. Rather, he focuses more narrowly and technically on Habermas's "Kantian pragmatism." Baynes writes: "Habermas's philosophical career can easily and instructively be read as a succession of attempts to appropriate the achievements of Kant's critical philosophy without being drawn into his commitment to a 'philosophy of the subject'" (194). Baynes then spends the rest of his chapter discussing the links between Habermas's Kantian pragmatism and his theory of communicative reason and discourse ethics.

In the more systematic part of the collection, Simone Chambers provides a fine overview of the issue of politics in Critical Theory. She begins by stating that it has become commonplace to point out that Horkheimer and Adorno have no politics. Their politics of "engaged withdrawal" is closely related to their ambiguous position with regard to the Enlightenment (220–23). In many ways, Marcuse shares this skepticism in his politics of the "great refusal" (224–28). Habermas's less critical position with regard to the Enlightenment tradition is interpreted by Chambers via its politics of constitutional design and procedural theory of deliberative democracy (229–32). She ends her chapter with reference to Axel Honneth's politics of recognition and his debate with Nancy Fraser and Seyla Benhabib (237–43).

Hauke Brunkhorst, for his part, discusses the differences between Horkheimer and Adorno, on the one hand, and Habermas, on the other, with regard to contemporary mass culture. As Rush indicates, the thesis of "enlightenment as mass deception" eventually steers Horkheimer and Adorno's reception of mass culture in a direction where the revolutionary tendencies of culture remains in the background. With Habermas, the analysis move closer to its Marxist point of departure, toward political democracy and the democratic public sphere (5).

Beatrice Hanssen interprets the tension-filled relation between Critical Theory and poststructuralism by considering Habermas and Foucault. Normally this tension is presented through Habermas's theory of communicative action and its normative validity claims, on the one hand, and the antifoundationalism of poststructuralism, on the other (280). Part of this interpretation results from Habermas's tendency to draw a line from Nietzschean aestheticism via Horkheimer and Adorno to poststructuralism (285). Hanssen also sketches

Habermas's analysis of political and aesthetic modernity (286–93), before she turns to Foucault's early Nietzschean phase which eventually moved to a greater appreciation of Kant (293–306). Finally, through a fine reading of Benjamin, Hanssen proposes a fragile space of theoretical reconciliation between Foucault and Habermas with regard to the concepts of rescuing and consciousness-raising critique (304–6).

The final two chapters focus in a systematic manner on the present and possible future relevance of Critical Theory. Here we have two voices from the so-called third generation of Critical Theory, Stephen White and Axel Honneth. White considers the status of Critical Theory as a distinctive research program in the social sciences, both past and present. His argument, basically, is that Critical Theory can, when appropriately revised, constitute a defensible, critical social science (310). He bases such a revision on two intellectual sources: Habermas's attempt to articulate a systematically critical approach to social inquiry since 1970 and pragmatism (311). White then contextualizes his argument in terms of a specific social science, political science. Here the argument is that Critical Theory has a substantial edge when it comes to a comparison with a competing research tradition such as rational choice theory (312). Honneth focuses on three aspects of the intellectual legacy of Critical Theory that need a creative answer in the present. Firstly, he refers to a socially deficient reason (or social pathology of reason) that all the major theorists of Critical Theory respectively try to come to terms with (338–45). He then argues that the answer to deficient social reason differs in liberalism and communitarianism (338–45). Honneth then provides a sociological explanation of a deficient reason via capitalism (345–52). Finally, he sketches possible alternatives that lead to a concept of emancipation appropriate to our time (352–57).

Fred Rush has edited a useful companion to Critical Theory. Although some of the contributions have more merits than others, all are well researched and of high scholarly quality. But there are also some shortcomings. In many ways, Rush missed the opportunity to present a more coherent picture of Critical Theory in all its complexity to the extent that his very short introduction does not really provide a good background to the three generations of Critical Theory or sufficiently introduce the different contributions. Secondly, the coherence of the companion is compromised by the selection of contributions. While essays 1 to 7 deal mainly historically with the ideas of first generation (Horkheimer, Adorno, and Marcuse), Habermas only makes his entry in chapter 8 in a very technical discussion. One could argue that Habermas is partially present in chapters 9–13, but given his enormous ambitious attempt to reformulate and reinterpret Critical Theory, one expects a greater focus on his work. Thirdly, it has been mentioned that Critical Theory can be defined in a narrow and broader way. There is a lot about Critical Theory in the narrow sense in this companion, but little on its relationship with critical theory in the broader sense, including feminism, postcolonialism, and critical race theory. On the whole, Rush's companion leaves a scattered impression. Not even the useful bibliography at the end can remedy this feeling when one looks back at a project that could have ended differently.

Pieter Duvenage has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of the North, Limpopo, South Africa, and Visiting Professor of Philosophy and Media Studies at the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, Port Elizabeth. He currently teaches philosophy and media studies at various universities in Johannesburg and Pretoria. His books include *Habermas and Aesthetics* (2003).

ERRATUM

The first paragraph of Johannes Fritsche's review of Richard Wolin's *The Seductions of Unreason*, which appeared in last issue of Constellations (14.1: 154–56), should have read as follows:

> Postmodernism, when it emerged in the 1960s in France, reacted against Sartre's Humanism and an ossified Marxism and instead gave, as Wolin quotes Chantal Mouffe, "a new 'articulation'" (4) to Counter-Enlightenment thinkers, most notably Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Schmitt. After discussing the issue of National Socialism in the latter two in others of his numerous books and articles, in which he has demonstrated his fluency and knowledge in philosophy, the arts, other cultural matters, and politics on both sides of the Rhine, intellectual historian Richard Wolin now focuses on the other leg of postmodernism, on Nietzsche.

The words "in the latter two" were omitted in the printed version. We regret the error.