Hoy, David Couzens. *Critical Resistance: From Poststructuralism to Post-Critique*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004. Pp. 274.

David Couzens Hoy's *Critical Resistance* is "a historical and topical guide" to poststructural theories of "emancipatory resistance to domination" (2). Tracing the origins of poststructuralism to a Nietzschean genealogical critique, which begins to be expressed in Gilles Deleuze's *Nietzsche and Philosophy* (1962), *Critical Resistance* takes up some of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault, Pierre Bourdieu, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Ernesto Laclau, and Slavoj •i•ek and emphasizes the important position that concepts of resistance occupy in poststructural thought. Hoy discusses these poststructural thinkers in relation to some of the theories of Sarah Kofman, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Judith Butler, Martin Heidegger, Terry Eagleton and others. Indeed, it is Hoy's ability to contextualize poststructuralism in relation to both contemporary theory and the philosophical tradition that makes *Critical Resistance* such a strong examination of poststructuralism.

The first chapter focuses on the influence that Nietzsche's genealogical mode of inquiry, which "does not insist on truths that are true forever," has on poststructural theories of critique (22-23). Hoy argues that, for Deleuze, the Nietzschean "affirmation cannot be opposed to negation" but, instead, should be read as a multiplicity of becoming that exists in the play of its difference (25-26). Here, Nietzsche, as the philosopher of multiplicity, influences not only Deleuze, but Derrida and Foucault as well. Yet, along with a philosophy of multiplicity, poststructuralists, as neo-Nietzscheans, "inherit the standard accusations that are leveled against Nietzsche: that they are unable to account for agency, responsibility, rationality, human nature, community, and ethical and political values" (30). In *Critical Resistance*, these accusations are met head on. For Hoy, not only can poststructuralism account for these notions, but, it can, also redeploy them as a radical means of critical resistance, which, with a Nietzschean edge, is resistance that is self critical—resistance that resists itself.

The next chapter begins with the influence that Nietzsche has on Foucault's own genealogical critique. Hoy focuses upon Foucault's critique of the relationship between institutions, discourse, and self-interpretation to argue that Foucault's genealogical analyses reveal any present self-interpretation to be only one interpretation out of many possible interpretations (72). Hoy writes that just "as Nietzsche thinks of the body not as a single unity but as a plurality of (sometimes

conflicting) drives, Foucault thinks that we are always 'more' than the one, dominant interpretation of ourselves that we tend to take for granted as both universal and natural" (72). Thus, critical resistance derives both agency and force in the realization of the possibility of alternative self-interpretations that can challenge the dominant interpretations, which render the individual an immobilized subject of a given power structure (72). Yet, for Foucault, the possibility of resistance implies that a given power structure is in place and, thus, resistance does not always disrupt or inhibit power but often sustains it (82). What Foucault's genealogies regularly uncover is that subjects do not produce domination but, instead, domination produces its subjects (88). According to Butler's deployment of Foucault, the subject recognizes its constraints as the very borders constitutive of itself and, thus, in resistance, motivated only by a sort of ethic of self-critique, the subject risks deformation of itself, in order to move beyond itself (100).

Like the previous chapter, Chapter 3 takes up notions of subject formation and their role in critical resistance but, here, the focus is upon Bourdieu rather than Foucault. For Hoy, "Foucault and Bourdieu can profitably be put on the same spectrum insofar as Bourdieu can be read as deepening Foucault's account of how subjectivity is constructed through power relations by providing a more detailed sociological theory of this process" (101). He points out that Bourdieu's socioanalysis aims at uncovering and dispelling "the social myths that perpetuate domination" (121). Hoy argues that Bourdieu's "method of reflexive socio-analysis reveals the arbitrariness of social relations scientifically, and thus . . . makes resistance genuinely critical" (15). Hoy writes that, for Bourdieu, "the concern of philosophy for the universal often ignores 'the conditions of access to the universal' and it 'generally serves to justify the established order, the prevailing distribution of powers and privileges—the domination of the bourgeois, white, Euro-American heterosexual male'" (143). I would add that this criticism of philosophy as a phallogocentrism is a critique that Bourdieu holds in common with Derrida and other poststructural thinkers. For Hoy, it is Bourdieu's insistence on the primacy of the body and his refusal of the importance of language that distinguishes him from other poststructurals (123). However, this refusal of the importance of language in poststructural thought threatens to extend beyond Bourdieu to *Critical Resistance* itself, which consistently refuses to acknowledge the importance of language and literature to poststructural writing. Just as the next chapter pairs Levinas and Derrida, this chapter would benefit from a pairing of Pierre Bourdieu

with Roland Barthes, where Barthes's critical insight into the importance of language to the performance of theory would open up a dialogue concerning the use of language to resist the codification of theory.

Chapter 4 pairs Levinas and Derrida to argue that it is in the neither/nor (either/or) of Levinas and Heidegger, of our own death and the death of the other, that Derrida is able to posit an ethics of critical resistance and a hope for a future to come. Hoy argues that for Levinas, ethics involves a responsibility for the other through the recognition of the alterity of the other—through an insistence on preserving this radical separation and difference (153). Hence, where Heidegger holds the sense of individuality ('mineness') as primary, Levinas argues that the very sense of individuality derives in the recognition of the otherness of the other (153). Where Heidegger argues that it is the sense of our own death to come that gives value to life (being-toward-death), Levinas holds that since we do not experience our own death, it is the death of the other, as well as death as other, that marks our primary responsibility as to the other (168-173). According to Hoy, Derrida turns the either/or of Levinas and Heidegger, of our own death and the death of the other, into a neither/nor, where the impossibility of experiencing death, whether it be the death of the other or our own death, shows death to be a cultural experience in which our naming of death as death has deceived us into thinking that we understand death, which, of course, is beyond understanding (166, 167, 176). As Hoy points out, much of Derrida's critique of Heidegger derives from his mistrust of Heidegger's "distinction between perishing, demise, and being-toward-death," which Derrida shows to rely on an earlier distinction between animals and humans (175). For Derrida, humans like animals cannot experience death and, instead, are deceived into thinking they understand death through their experience of cultural notions of death—of naming death as death (176). Hoy argues that Derrida's displacement of death as a foundation for ethics develops into an ethics without foundation where the ethical responsibility to resist domination must practice resistance while preserving a self-critical perspective to its own resistance (179, 184). For Derrida, given that the present is always out of joint (unjust), and that the future holds the possibility of justice, ethical resistance becomes the imperative to disrupt today in the hope of a more just tomorrow. For Hoy, it is this constant possibility of a more just future that "precludes passivity or abstention and requires commitment" to a future that "cannot be calculated, predicted, or programmed, but is always unexpected" (189).

In the next chapter, Hoy moves on to theorize the possibility of a post-Marxist deconstruction. He points out that to Marxist critics, deconstruction often "seems necessarily reactionary and conservative because it seems to lose all grounds for criticizing and resisting social oppression" (195). Given this Marxist suspicion of the politics of deconstruction, Hoy posits a need to examine the possibility that deconstruction can act as a means of social critique and critical resistance (197). Hoy argues that, for Laclau, there is no clear distinction between the social reality and the discursive practices about it, and, thus, social practices must be examined with the same principles (mainly the play of differences) with which discursive practices are examined (202). Hence, Laclau argues that ideology is not a misrecognition of a social reality but, instead, a non-recognition of the difference that must be excluded for an ideology to persist (204). Similarly, Hoy points out that, according to •i•ek, ideology is not an illusion used to disfigure a reality but, instead, a social reality that masks an impossible (Lacanian) real (218). Thus, for •i•ek, truth is the product of a misrecognition and the idea that there are real interests without ideology, before ideology, is an ideological distortion (223-224). Given that both Laclau and •i•ek theorize poststructural notions of ideology, which no longer equate ideology to false consciousness, Hoy argues that there is a place in the future of Marxist criticism to take up a deconstructive genealogy (226).

In the "Postscript" to *Critical Resistance*, Hoy calls for a deconstructive genealogy that practices critical resistance, while, at the same time, recognizes that complex possibilities always exceed critique to call for a critique of the critique (233). Following Derrida, Hoy writes that resistance must act with a less than good conscience in order to remain open for criticism (238). For Hoy, genealogy opens the world for change: that is, by showing the current social reality to be only one reality out of other possible realities, genealogy undermines the truth claims that maintain the status quo and, thus, allows for the possibility of change (238). In his depiction of the politics of genealogical deconstruction, Hoy has convincingly captured some of the politics that animate the poststructural challenges to the phallogocentrism of the Western Tradition.

The irony is that *Critical Resistance*, a text that calls for deconstructive genealogy, is barely genealogical and not at all deconstructive. Moreover, in Hoy's depiction of the argument between Derrida and John Searle, on the value of the foundational distinctions, which authorize philosophy, the author sides with Searle, to argue that Derrida's deconstruction of

philosophical distinctions is mistaken (177). But surely, it is Hoy who is mistaken. For Derrida, the distinctions that mark the foundations of philosophy undermine the entire philosophy that they are built upon because the marginal possibilities, which are excluded by the distinctions, return to haunt, as well as corrupt, every utterance that depends on their exclusion. Hence, a philosophy that attempts to theorize speech acts, by excluding the possibility of the lie, fails to recognize that the possibility of the lie is inherent in the most honest of speech acts. Similarly, a text that attempts to take up poststructural theory, by excluding the complexity of the language in which it is written, fails to recognize that the figurative language of poststructural theories is itself a critical resistance to the process of codification that *Critical Resistance* attempts to enact.

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Noland, Carrie. *Poetry at Stake: Lyric Aesthetics and the Challenge of Technology.* Princeton: Princeton UP, 1999. Pp. 280.

In *Poetry at Stake*, Carrie Noland undertakes a revisionist study that posits "an alternative critical discourse on lyric poetry as well as an alternative account of its evolution into the plurivocal poetries of the twentieth-century avant-garde" (7). Noland begins by recalling a little known work by Guillaume Apollinaire, "L'Esprit nouveau et les poètes," a 1917 lecture and manifesto that called for a hybridization of lyric composition and technology. Her aim is to re-historicize late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century poetic practices by calling into question the traditional binarism that opposes the corrupting influences of early industrial modernity to the work of the isolated poet who resists its effects and remains unsullied by them. Taking her cue from Apollinaire, Noland argues that lyrical poetry need not be merely defined through the resistance it mounts to the forces of commerce, mass culture and technology. Rather, in the modern era, its marketing modalities and integration in technology-saturated settings create contexts where the relation of poetic form to print and electronic media does not have to be one of mutual indifference. Noland is cognizant, however, that poetic language and its lyrical force can be readily instrumentalized and commodified. How, then, are we to understand poetry's subversive and emancipatory powers in societies dominated by the mass production,